

HISTORICAL STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SCIENCE: MILITARY SCIENCE OF THE NEW ERA

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Abstract

The rapid growth of the economy, especially in the second half of the 18th century, the growing contradictions between the emerging new bourgeois military system and the outdated feudal-absolutist one, the rapid development of natural and social sciences and their ever-increasing differentiation, the improvement of weapons and military equipment, the accumulation of experience of numerous wars – all this contributed to the activation of military-theoretical thought, required generalization and comprehension. In Europe, this process developed in a complex and long way, contributing to the formation of military theory.

The article discusses the formation and development of foreign military-theoretical thought in the 18th – the second half of the 19th centuries, as well as the views of foreign military theorists in the late 19th – early 20th centuries.

Keywords: Military science; Military art; strategy; tactics; "geometric strategy"; "modern military system"; "Strategic Concept", "Operational Area"; Blitzkrieg.

Introduction

With the establishment of capitalism in a number of Western European countries¹, the material base for waging war was considerably expanded, and the population increased. This allowed some of the most economically developed states to create large armies with centralized command and supply, to equip them with artillery and more advanced hand-held firearms, which became the most important factor in the armed struggle. At the same time, the wars received a large, The earlier the scale, the forms and methods of their preparation and conduct have changed.

At the same time, despite a certain revival, Western European military theory continued to remain at an exceptionally low level until the last quarter of the eighteenth century and lagged far behind the requirements of military practice. It was represented by works, mainly of a memoir nature, in which there was still no broad philosophical and political view of war, the armed forces, and military affairs in general.

¹ Capitalism is a social and economic system of production and distribution based on private property, legal equality, and free enterprise.

In the memoirs of military-historical and military-theoretical literature, in the 18th century, relatively mature works appeared, which had a noticeable impact on the theory and practice of military affairs. For example, in the works of the French military historians and theoreticians A. Fékière (Memoirs of the War) and J.-C. Folard (the six-volume History of Polybius), the Prussian king and general Frederick II ("Instruction or Military Instructions of the King of Prussia to His Generals" and "The History of the Seven Years' War") already quite clearly traces the connection of military events with politics, economics, and other aspects of social life, points out the dependence of the army, its victories and defeats on material and technical supplies, etc. Their influence on the preparation, occurrence and course of wars was still interpreted in a very primitive way.

It is said that "for the first time the milestones for the scientific development of strategy" in its modern sense were outlined, proceeding, however, from the analysis of the works of ancient Greek military writers, by an officer of the Sardinian General Staff, Marquis de Silva. In his treatise Reflections on Tactics and Strategy, or the True Principles of Military Science, he attempted to define the object (tasks) of military strategy as a theory. In particular, the Marquis referred to these as "drawing up plans of military operations, working out general ideas (principles) of the art of war, the ability to derive the greatest benefit from the available means and forces, as well as to combine them in the best possible way" [1. Art. 320.].

In the last quarter of the 18th century, Henry Lloyd's "History of the Seven Years' War" and Heinrich Dietrich Bülow's "The Spirit of the Modern Military System" were published, which are regarded by military historiography as the primary basis of the theory of strategy. The views set forth in them had a noticeable influence on many military researchers of the 19th century.

H. Lloyd (c. 1720–1783) does not yet use the word "strategy" in his writings, but in his person Western European military thought, in the figurative expression of A.A. Svechin, "for the first time rose to the strategic level of the art of war." He already clearly sees, Svechin writes, "the vast field of questions connected with the conduct of war and is beginning to study it." H. Lloyd was the first military theorist to come to the conclusion about the existence of military science, considering it the most difficult of the existing sciences. However, he limited the subject matter of military science only to the problems of preparation for war, and reduced its content to the permanent principles on which the art of war is supposedly based. Lloyd attributed questions related to the conduct of war, i.e. military operations proper, to the competence of the genius of the commander, asserting that they do not lend themselves to scientific research, are not subject to any laws and rules.

Lloyd considered fortification, topography, geography, and mathematics **to be the most important subjects in military science**. He asserted that if all the geographical and topographical data of the terrain were comprehensively examined, "it is possible to calculate all operations with geometrical precision and to carry on a constant war without being compelled to engage in battle." In his works, H. Lloyd outlined the limits and defined the directions in which the problems of strategy as a science should be developed, developed the

doctrine of the operational line, giving it primary importance in strategy. noted the importance of the principle of concentration of forces, etc.

Speaking of the work of Baron G.D. Bülow (1757–1807), it is necessary to emphasize that he was a representative, but more striking, of the same trend in theory that H. Lloyd adhered to. In his major work, *The Spirit of the Modern Military System*, Bülow expounded with Prussian pedantry his strategic concept of maneuvering on the enemy's lines of communication, which was based on the denial of the role of the decisive battle in achieving victory. In both offensive and defensive, this theorist argued, "it is more apt for the spirit of the modern military system of war to make the enemy's stores and supply lines connecting them with the army the object of military operations than the enemy's army itself."

Like Lloyd, Bülow recognized the existence of the science of war (even tried to define it), dividing it into strategy and tactics. By strategy, Bülow meant the science of "movements in which the enemy is the target but not the object." Tactics, on the other hand, "is the science of military movements which have as their object the enemy." Strategic, according to Bülow, are all military movements beyond the reach of a cannon shot and the enemy's field of vision. Tactical, all combat movements within sight of the enemy's army. **"Where blows are exchanged," he pointed out, "there are tactics; Where there is no fighting, there is a strategy."** Tactics, according to Bülow, "are an adjunct to strategy. The former finishes what the latter prepares."

Bülow's strategic system (the so-called "geometrical strategy") was born of armchair calculations, and in this sense Bülow is the forerunner of the "armchair" theoreticians of the nineteenth century, such as Willisen, Rüstow, Leer, and others. "pushing" him out by his actions on communications, winning the war by one manoeuvre without a battle.

G. Bülow, like H. Lloyd, expounds his strategic system in the form of geometrical theorems ("geometrical strategy"), which testifies to the desire of these military theoreticians to transform the art of war (science) from the sphere of spontaneous development (under the influence of the "genius" of commanders) into a field that lends itself to scientific foresight and analysis of the laws of war and military affairs.

The Great French Revolution of 1789–1794 played a decisive role in completing the process of transforming military knowledge into a relatively independent science, which led to profound transformations in military affairs and gave a powerful impetus to the development of all its branches. After it, a whole galaxy of major military theorists and historians appeared in Western Europe – Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz, Willisen, later Moltke (senior), Schlichting, Schlieffen, Foch and others. In terms of their scientific level, their works are much higher than the military-theoretical works of the previous decades, which is explained by the much greater depth and higher degree of theoretical and philosophical generalization achieved in them. This is especially true of those works in which dialectics has been applied consciously and consistently, albeit on an idealist basis (e.g., the writings of Clausewitz).

Having reorganized the armed forces of revolutionary France, Napoleon (1769–821) developed a "modern military system," new forms and methods of warfare, new methods of training and educating troops, and introduced cardinal innovations in military science.

Napoleon left a number of works that had a great influence on the subsequent development of military-theoretical thought. A special place among them is occupied by his "Commentaries" (published in 6 volumes), in which the most instructive campaigns of great commanders are briefly but vividly described. In the process of polemical analysis of the works of a number of military writers, Napoleon consistently expounds his own ideas. Many of his statements on strategy and tactics very clearly reflect the principles of French warfare in the early nineteenth century.

Napoleon recognized the theory which, in his opinion, was necessary in all the sciences in order to give general ideas about the subject. He wrote, "... that war must be conducted according to the rules of the art of war, that the strength of an army in the field must be proportioned to the obstacles anticipated, and that the whole art consists in removing obstacles which impede action, etc."

All great generals have done great things, Napoleon wrote, only because they "followed the rules and natural arts in the matter of combinations... They never ceased to create a new science out of the war" [2: Art. 195-196.]. Proceeding from the above, it is legitimate to conclude that Napoleon recognized the science of war (the science of war) and was a striking representative of the critical-historical method of studying its laws.

The first half of the 19th century is closely associated with the names of G. Jomini and K. Clausewitz. Antoine Henri (Genrikh Veniaminovich) Jomini (1779–1869), a participant in many wars and battles, military theorist and historian (1779–1869) wrote a significant number of works, the most famous of which are "Treatise on Great Military Operations" (4 volumes, 1804–1810), "Critical Military History of the Wars of the Revolution" (15 volumes, 1811-1824), "Political and Military Life of Napoleon" (4 volumes, 1827), "Essays on the Art of War" (2 volumes, 1837). These and other works and the ideas set forth in them make it possible to classify him as one of the founders of military-theoretical thought. The main merit of Jomini is the generalization of the experience of wars.

Reflecting on the wars waged by the French army under the leadership of Napoleon, Jomini came to the conclusion that the defeat of the enemy should not be achieved by maneuvering, but only by decisive offensive battle (in this sense he was the embodiment of the school of strategy of defeat), which is possible by applying the principles common to military operations.

Jomini argued that war is an art, not a science. In discussing the art, he considered strategy to be the science of warfare, and tactics as the science of battle and combat. His name is associated with the introduction of such concepts as the theater of war, the theater of military operations (as part of it), the operational zone, as well as the emergence of the idea of eternal absolute, unchangeable laws of the art of war, which later became widespread.

Admiring the genius of Napoleon, Jomini systematized his methods and methods of warfare, clothed them in "eternal" principles, suitable, in his opinion, for all wars in any era. This

theoretician believed that they "do not depend on the nature of the properties of the weapons and on the organization of the troops." Jomini considered the art of war in isolation from production, socio-economic and political conditions, it was everywhere associated with the "genius" and "tact" of the commander, that is, he rejected the so-called "positive" theory in military affairs.

Jomini also did not fully understand the relationship between politics and strategy. In his view, politics influences strategy only at the beginning of a war; the influence of politics on military operations during the war was underestimated by Jomini. Yet it must be noted that the strategy of crushing, the principle of partial victory, and other questions investigated and put on a pedestal by Jomini's theory, were the creed of all General Staffs up to and including the First World War.

While Jomini is rightfully considered one of the founders of military science, the German military theorist Carl Clausewitz (1780–1831) is its greatest representative of the 19th century. In his main military-theoretical work "On War" (3 volumes, 1832-1834 – posthumous edition), C. Clausewitz established a clear connection between war and politics. He defined war "as the continuation of state policy by other means" [3, Art. 54].

As for the laws of war, Clausewitz did not recognize them. He reasoned that the concept of law in the sense of knowledge of war is almost superfluous, because complex phenomena are not lawful enough, and lawful phenomena are not complex enough. The phenomena of military science are so changeable and so diverse that "they do not know statements that are general enough to deserve the name of law." The denial of laws in military affairs also led to the denial of military science: "Theory should not necessarily be a positive doctrine, i.e., a guide for action." The purpose of theory, according to Clausewitz, is to educate the mind of the future commander, to guide him in his self-education, but it "should not accompany him on the battlefield."

Thus, Clausewitz mistakenly believed that military theory (science) does not deal with objective laws, but only with principles, rules of warfare. In giving a general assessment of Clausewitz's military-theoretical views, it should be noted first of all that for their time they were progressive, directed against the feudal military system. The application of Hegelian dialectics allowed him not only to show the inadequacy of the old methods and forms of struggle, but also to see the new military phenomena inherent in the special historical conditions of the late nineteenth century. At the same time, Clausewitz's writings combined the most reactionary views of the Prussian military caste, with its militarism and nationalism, side by side with advanced ideas. It is no coincidence that his military-philosophical concepts had a strong influence on the military-theoretical thought of Germany until the beginning of World War II.

After Clausewitz, the German school put forward a number of military theorists: Berenhorst, Dekker, Wagner, and others. The only exception is the Prussian general, professor of the Berlin Military School (Academy) W. von Willisen (1790-1879), the author of the work "The Theory of the Great War" (in 4 volumes), who, according to A. Svechin, "for thirty years after

the publication of Clausewitz's works, challenged their leading position in German military thought" [4. Art. 23].

The first, the main department of military theory, or the science of the higher art of war, he considers the doctrine of messages, which he calls strategy, the second the doctrine of combat efficiency, the doctrine of combat or tactics [4, pp. 121-122]. Both, respectively, follow from the most important, in Willisen's opinion, properties of the army as the best means of war, i.e., its instrument and material: the need for supplies and combat efficiency, or the ability to act in war, the ability to strike. Willisen's one-sided theory, divorced from reality, and his desire to understand the basis of all the foundations of military science in the art of war, were born of a purely speculative method of his thinking. Nevertheless, Willisen's scientific views were widely disseminated, especially among citizen scientists and intellectuals. For a long time, his fame eclipsed Clausewitz.

Thus, in the period under review, foreign military-theoretical thought made a significant step forward in comparison with previous epochs. If at the end of the 17th and in the 18th centuries it was mainly aimed at systematizing and generalizing the knowledge accumulated in the military field, then in the second half of the 19th century military theory already had almost all the main features of science: the subject of research was defined, the basic concepts corresponding to it were developed, a certain theoretical generalization of the material and experience of the past was carried out, and a relatively harmonious system of principles was developed. The tasks of military theory grew and became more and more complex, and they became more and more differentiated, gradually dissecting into a number of relatively independent disciplines.

During this period, a whole galaxy of military theorists appeared, who expressed very rational ideas about the connection between war and politics, the forms and methods of waging war, the dependence of victory on material conditions and the subjective factor, command and control, military development, as well as on questions of strategy, tactics, and so on.

Development of Uzbek Military-Theoretical Thought in the Military Science of the New Time.

The works of the great Uzbek poets Zahriddin Muhammad Babur, Babarrahim Mashrab, Hafiz Khorezmi, Muhammad Riza Ogakhi and others are rightfully the golden pages and pride of Uzbek classical literature.

But the most valuable treasure and the greatest pride of Uzbek historiography, according to military historians, is the "Temur Code". During the lifetime of Amir Temur (1336–1405), a special work was written on state administration, known as the "Temur Code". Written in the old Uzbek language, it has survived to this day only in a Persian translation of the 17th century. It contains the autobiography of Amir Temur and the events related to his life,

Views of this outstanding statesman and commander on the art of war, the structure and administration of the country².

Another prominent figure who left his mark on Uzbek history and literature was the founder of the Mughal Empire in India, the last of the Timurids, Khan Zahridin Muhammad Babur (1483–1530). He became famous for his famous prose work "Baburnama", which is a one-of-a-kind source for the history of the peoples of Central Asia and one of the most remarkable literary monuments in the Uzbek language³.

The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries were characterized by radical changes in military affairs. Armies of many millions were created, and new means of warfare appeared and began to be used: machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, airplanes, submarines, and so on. Telegraph, telephone, and radio began to be used to control the troops. Technical and other sciences have made a new leap in their development. All this has had a great impact on the increase in scale and the changing nature of warfare. They took on a huge scale, their content became more complicated, which, in turn, led to another leap in the development of military-theoretical thought.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the most famous German military theorists were J. von Verdi-Vernoy, S. Schlichting, K. von der Goltz, Bernhardt, and A. Schlieffen.

Sigismund Wilhelm von Schlichting (1829–1909) wrote the extensive work *Fundamentals of Modern Tactics and Strategy*, published in 1897-1898 (in 2 parts, 3 books). In this work, the author rightly emphasizes that "never before have the means of warfare changed to such an extent as they did during the period from Napoleon to 1866..." The growth of culture, the development of artificial roads, the construction of railroads, the electric telegraph, rifled weapons, the enlargement of the army as a result of universal conscription—all these factors, Schlichting notes, influenced the methods of strategic leadership and the art of war in general. Comprehending the new phenomena in strategy and tactics that appeared in the wars of the second half of the 19th century, this theoretician acted as a preacher of the ideas of Moltke (the Elder), in whose military activity he saw the pinnacle of the art of war [5, p. 274].

Based on the experience of Moltke's wars, Schlichting argued that the outcome of the war, as before, would be decided in one general battle, and the envelopment of the enemy's flanks was the only correct course of action in a future war. Therefore, in his opinion, the strategic deployment of troops should be linear in the presence of strong flanks and a weak center. Strategic reserves were underestimated by Schlichting and considered superfluous. He recommended that all available forces and means should be thrown into battle at once for the sake of a decisive victory. Schlichting declared that the art of war was constantly changing, that no military system could serve as a universal guide for waging wars. Speaking

² Темур Тузуклари. – Т.: "O'zbekiston", 2018. – 184 б.; Менким, соҳибқирон – жаҳонгир Темур. – Т.: "Янги аср авлоди", 2018. – 572 б.

³ The Book of Mormon, by Z. M. / Z. M. Bobur – Т.: IJOD-PRESS, 2019. - 576 b.

of strategy, he asserted that it "is not a permanent science, as, for example, mathematics with its sum of angles in a triangle..., it follows from the conditions of the epoch and from the means of warfare that the latter represents" [6: p.14].

Of course, these ideas played a positive role for their time. At the beginning of the 20th century, Schlichting's theoretical positions were used as the basis of the military doctrine of Germany and were widely used in the process of training the command staff of its army.

The German ideologist Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), a follower of Clausewitz and Moltke, set forth his views on the methods of warfare and combat in military manuals, manuals, as well as in a number of military-theoretical and historical works: "Cannes", "The Battle of Cannae", "Frederick the Great and Napoleon", "The Campaign of 1870–1871". In all his works, he pursued the goal not so much to analyze the military events of the past as to prove the viability of his strategic concepts, to confirm them with historical examples and facts.

Schlieffen's whole activity was to prepare Germany for a war of conquest on a large scale. He preached the ideas of "blitzkrieg" and "lightning war" and believed that the strategy of attrition was impossible in the new conditions. The core of the entire concept of "blitzkrieg" was the doctrine of the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in one grandiose general battle of encirclement (the so-called "Cannes doctrine"). This concept was formalized in 1910 in the German manual for the high command (the Schlieffen Doctrine), which emphasized the need to achieve "the goal of the entire campaign after a decisive battle alone" [5, p. 275]. The experience of the Franco-Prussian War and the first wars of the epoch of imperialism confronted German military leaders with the fact that it was impossible to bring modern warfare to a quick end, which has been noted by a number of scholars. For example, Verdier recognized in 1903 that it was no longer possible to achieve victory in a war by a single general battle, in order to achieve the final result, a number of intermediate tasks would have to be solved.

Consequently, German military leaders and theoreticians did not fully take into account the socioeconomic conditions that had changed at the beginning of the 20th century, overestimated the importance of surprise of the attack and the force of the initial blow, idealized strategic envelopment as a form of maneuver of troops, and took false positions of waging a "lightning war" against strong opponents on two fronts – in the West and in the East. Nevertheless, these concepts, which reflected the aggressive aspiration of the military strategy of German military specialists to world domination, had a great influence on the formation of the official views of the German army not only before the First World War, but also between the First and Second World Wars.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the views of French military leaders and theorists reflected the idea of mainly defensive actions in relation to Germany, the main rival on the European continent, a strong, aggressive neighbor. In the following years, military-theoretical concepts in France gradually changed, which was naturally reflected in strategic plans. Before the First World War, they were generally offensive in nature. The views of

French theorists began to be dominated by the ideas of "lightning war", which did not take into account the changes that took place at the turn of the century in military affairs.

The greatest military theoretician and practitioner of France at this stage was Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929), who wrote *On the Principles of War* (1903), *On the Conduct of War* (1904), and others. In them, Foch argued that the scale of a modern war would be grandiose, could not last long, and would have to be waged with brutal energy in order to achieve its goal quickly. He considered the offensive to be the main type of warfare. In the course of which he recommended the extensive use of circumventions and coverage. On the whole, Foch correctly understood the dependence of strategy on politics. The latter, in his opinion, should set goals (objectives) for the strategy, otherwise it will act blindly [5, Art. 276].

In *On the Principles of War*, Foch dwells in detail on military theory (science). "The art of war, like any other art," he declares, "has its own theory, its own principles, otherwise it would not be an art." But he, like Jomini and many other scholars, considered the principles of the art of war to be immutable, absolute. Foch believed that the art of war consisted of strategy and tactics. Strategy, in his opinion, should deal not with war as a whole, but with military battles, i.e. he narrowed and limited the scope of strategy. Foch underestimated the role of the generals and the role of the masses.

A feature of the strategic concept of another French military theorist, General Bonnal, was the desire for cautious and prudent actions.

Bonnal's cautious strategy was opposed by Colonel Grandmaison. The latter was a staunch supporter of the offensive alone, demanding that it be conducted with all forces, decisively, without guards, without reserves, and even without reconnaissance. He completely rejected the possibility of defense for the French army, recommending that all forces be thrown into the offensive "at once, without looking back" and that it should be carried out decisively, "leading your army against the enemy in constant readiness to fall upon him with all your corps." Grandmaison argued that in war, "the best actions are often the most reckless, and it is only a matter of doing them with conviction." The role of the army commander was reduced by this theoretician to give the order to the troops to go on the offensive when the enemy was detected. In these views one can clearly see the adventurism borrowed from the German theoreticians. The complete denial of defense testified to Grandmaison's lack of understanding of the conditions of contemporary wars, the scope, duration, and intensity of which were constantly growing [5, p. 277].

Grandmaison's views were reflected in the manuals, regulations, and instructions of France and in the "Regulations on the Management of Large Military Formations," which was adopted in 1913. All commanders were categorically required to "not hesitate in making decisions and throw their last forces into battle for the sake of victory." The situation directed everyone to wage a short-term war. The main means of achieving victory was considered to be a general battle, in which it was supposed to destroy all the armed forces of the enemy and decide not only the outcome of the war, but also the fate of the nation.

In general, the majority of foreign military theorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, due to the lack of a truly scientific methodology in the study of the processes of war, military theory and practice, were characterized by a lag in the comprehension of new phenomena in military affairs, in the assessment of the changed conditions of armed struggle, admiration for old models, the proclamation of eternal and unchangeable principles, the idealization of this or that method of waging war. conservatism of many military-theoretical positions.

Thus, at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, military-theoretical thought took shape as a relatively independent, concrete field of knowledge about war, the army, and military affairs. Subsequently, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, there was an accumulation of military-theoretical knowledge, military science became more and more differentiated, gradually dividing into a number of branches (sciences), its volume and content significantly expanded.

During this period, a whole galaxy of military theorists appeared in Western Europe, whose works covered various aspects of military affairs from a scientific standpoint. However, it was not possible to create a general military theory as a basis for the development of specific theories of its various branches.

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