THE MAJOR ASPECTS IN THE NOTION OF PRAGMALINGUISTICS

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Abstract
The article below is aimed to analyze aspects of pragmatics: speech acts and conversational implicature, which are the main notions of pragmalinguistics. While delivering a particular speech act, the addressee has some aims to realize and they are called as pragmatic intentions, in this article, the types of these intentions are enumerated and analyzed with samples taken from various texts.

Keywords: pragmalingistic, speech acts, conversational implicature, cooperative principles, maxim of quantity, maxim of quality, maxim of relevance, maxim of manner.

Introduction

Language is the main device of communication. As a means of building social relations, language performs various functions. Malinowski in Holliday classifies language functions into two large groups. The first is pragmatic, in which this function is the further divided into narrative and active. In this case, the main function of the language is as a means of communication. The second is magical, in which language is used in ceremonial or religious activities in a culture.

So, until the center of the 20th century, the term "pragmatics" was utilized in different areas of science (such as semiotics, philosophy, sociology, psychology), as a result of which its substance got to be exceptionally wide and vague. Pragmatics shows the relationship between a language sign and a language user. According to researchers, a distinctive feature of pragmatics is that the speaker is in the center. That is why pragmatics sensitively captures any changes that occur with this personal sphere of the speaker, which is "the subjective principle that each speaker brings to the communication process." According to Yu.S. Stepanov, the subject of the study of pragmatics is the discourse, which is correlated with its main creator - a person. The language of a person is so deeply and organically connected with the expression of the personal properties of the person himself, if the language is deprived of such a connection, it can hardly function and be called a language.

Main Part
Speech Acts

We have already found out that linguistic pragmatics studies the conditions for the use of language by communicants in acts of verbal communication. Specifically, these conditions include the communicative goals of the interlocutors, the time and place of the speech act, the level of knowledge of the communicants, their social statuses, psychological and biological characteristics, the rules and conventions of speech behavior adopted in a particular society, etc. In the process of verbal communication, communicants use one or another code (language, according to F. de Saussure), as well as other sign systems, including paralinguistic ones. The conditions for using a language are often divided into context (linguistic conditions), consituation (extralinguistic conditions) and co-empiricism (the level of linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge of communicants). However, all these conditions are often referred to as a single term "context", in which exceptionally different content is embedded. Normally, pragmatics ought to take into consideration the affect that such a setting has on the language implies utilized within the handle of communication.

An important place in linguistic pragmatics is occupied by John Austin, (March 26, 1911 Lancaster, England; - February 8, 1960 Oxford, England) British philosopher-analyst, representative of linguistic philosophy. J. Austin was educated at Oxford University, where he later became a professor of philosophy (1952-1960). For the first time, speech act theory was presented by J. Austin in a course of lectures called "How to Do Things with Words", read at Harvard University in 1955. Austin outlined his theory of speech acts and the concept of performative language. Performative language is like saying something by doing it. To put it simply, speech acts are things that people do through language.[1] For example, we apologize, instruct, threaten, explain, declare, etc.

A single speech act appears to Austin as a three-level formation. The speech act in relation to the linguistic means used in its course acts as a locutionary act (pronunciation of an appeal); in relation to the manifested goal and a number of conditions for its implementation - as an illocutionary act (the speaker's intention to establish contact, characterize the addressee, etc.); in relation to its results - as a perlocutionary act (impact on the addressee). Austin's main innovation in this scheme is the concept of illocution, since semantics has always dealt with locution, and perlocution has been the object of study of rhetoric. Austin does not give a precise definition of the concept of "illocutionary act". He only gives examples for them - a

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[1] Ахманова, О.С. Прагматическая лингвистика, прагмалингвистика и лингвистическая прагматика Текст. / О.С. Ахманова, И.М. Магидова // Вопросы языкознания. М., 1978. - №3. - С. 43-48.

question, an answer, information, assurance, warning, appointment, criticism, etc.[2] Speech act theory teaches how to act with words, "how to manipulate things with words" (this is a literal translation of Austin's seminal book, How to do things with words).[3] Austin's paradigm is any sentence beginning with T by an illocutionary verb, like promise, apologize or request, in the simple present tense and active voice represents performative utterance. For example, to make a statement like *I promise you I will wait for you, no matter* what is actually to perform the act of promising as opposed to make a statement that may be judged true or false. We cannot then use the past version of it like *I promised to go*. We see the performative verb used here, which is *promise* used to add convince, reassure and as well as making swear so the receiver will trust the speaker, and that is the reason why the sentence should be uttered at the present time, using the first person point of view.

Let us consider the following sentences as an example

1. I pronounce you man and wife

2. I declare war on France

3. I bet you 10 dollars it will snow

4. I order you to go

5. I sentence you to death

6. I accept your apology

7. I resign from this pathetic job!

8. You are under arrest!

9. I dedicate this book to my parents

10. I warn you to not stepping on wet floor

According to Austin the examples above are not used to say or describe things, but rather actively to do things, even though in reality is no action that can represent the performative verbs, like promise, resign, declare etc. By saying *I apologize,* that person performs an expressive act simultaneously in the name of that expressive act.[4]

Austin then creates a clear distinction between performatives and constatives, statements that attempt to describe reality and can be judged true or false, but he eventually comes to the conclusion that most utterances, at their base, are performative in nature. That is, the speaker is nearly always doing something by saying something. The sentence like no. 1, in which one is marrying two people means to create a social reality, in this case is to create a reality of a (just) married couple.

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[2] Остин Дж. Слово как действие. Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Вып. 17. Теория речевых актов. - М., 1986.

[3] Austin J.L. How to do things with words. - In: "Sens and Sensibilia"

[4] Вежбицка А. Речевые акты. Там же Вып.16. Лингвистическая прагматика, 1985.

Austin at that point makes a clear qualification between performatives and constatives, statements that attempt to describe reality and can be judged true or false, but he eventually comes to the conclusion that most utterances, at their base, are performative in nature. That is, the speaker is about always doing something by saying something. The sentence like no. 1, in which one is marrying two people means to form a social reality, in this case is to create a reality of a (just) married couple. There are two types of performative utterances, as follows;

1.Explicit utterances:

utterances which have these characteristics and which sound correct if you add hereby:

I hereby promise you to...

To put it simply, explicit performances contain performative verbs naming the acts (e.g. I order you to leave)

2. Implicit utterances:

utterances which need expansion to make them explicit, or the utterances which do not contain performative verbs naming the act (e.g. Go! Leave!) In this case, speakers have to know something about the situation, like mood, tone of voice, adverbs, gestures, etc.[5]

In the two examples above, we can achieve the same purpose (giving an order) with "*Go*" as we did with "*I order you to go.*"

Conversation implicatures

The work of H.P.Grice takes pragmatics farther than the study of speech acts. Grice's aim was to understand how "speaker's meaning"-what someone uses utterance to mean mean – arises from "sentence meaning"- the literal form and meaning of an utterance. An implicature is something meant, implied, or suggested distinct from what is said. Implicatures can be part of sentence meaning or dependent on conversational context, and can be conventional or unconventional. Conversational implicatures have become one of the principal subjects of pragmatics. Figures of speech provide familiar examples. An important conceptual and methodological issue in semantics is how to distinguish senses and entailments from conventional implicatures.[6]

A mutual understanding is inevitably needed by a speaker and a hearer in order to construct a good communication. Understanding an utterance syntactically and semantically is not sufficient since the meaning of utterance is not only stated but it is also implied. In order to comprehend the implied meaning of an utterance, implicature becomes unavoidably essential. Implicature is a proposition that is implied by the

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[5] Остин Дж. Слово как действие. Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Вып. 17. Теория речевых актов. - М., 1986.
[6] Grice, H. Paul "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature." In P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, New York: Academic Press - 1981- pp. 183-97.

utterance in a context even though that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment of what is actually said. Cooperative principles proposed by Grice mentions that a speaker makes his conversational contribution such as is required at the stage in which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which he is engaged.[7] He, then, further divides the cooperative principles into four maxims: maxim of quality, maxim of quantity, maxim of relevance, and maxim of manner.

The philosopher Paul Grice proposed four conversational maxims that arise from the pragmatics of natural language. The Gricean Maxims are a way to explain the link between utterances and what is understood from them.

The **category of Quantity** relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims:

- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Example: Speaker A: "Do you know if Katie got on okay with her exams?
Speaker B: "Yes, I do. She did really well and got an A!"

Here speaker B could have ended their reply after *Yes, I do.* However, they shared all of the information they knew so as not to flout the Maxim of Quantity.

(The **second maxim** is disputable; it might be said that to be over-informative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time. However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular point in the provision of the excess of information. However this may be, there is perhaps a different reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, namely, that its will be secured by a later maxim, which concerns **relevance**).[8]

Example: Speaker A: "Do you think Leo is dating someone new?
Speaker B: "Well, he goes to Brighton most weekends"

Due to the Maxim of Relevance, we can infer that there is a link between Leo dating someone and him going to Brighton, and speaker B isn't just randomly telling us about Leo's trips to Brighton.

Under the **category of Quality** fall a supermaxim – "Try to make your contribution one that is true" – and two more specific maxims:

-Do not say what you believe to be false.

-Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

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[7] Wilson, D., and Sperber, D. On Grice's theory of conversation. In Conversation and Discourse, ed. P. Werth, New York: St. Martins Press -1981- pp. 15–78.

[8] Grice, H. Paul "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Review - 1969 - pp.147-177.

Under the category of Relation Grice places a single maxim, namely, 'Be relevant.' Though the maxim itself it terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems like questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on.[9]

Example: The capital of India is New Delhi

Here the speaker believes that they are telling the truth to the best of their knowledge

Finally, under the **category of Manner**, which Grice understands as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said, is included the supermaxim – 'Be perspicuous' – and various maxims such as:

- Avoid obscurity of expression.
- Avoid ambiguity.
- Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
- Be orderly.

Example: I am writing an essay on metonymy. It's a type of figure of speech.

Here the speaker knew that it was possible that the listener wouldn't know the term *metonymy* and decided to give a quick explanation

These maxims may be better understood as describing the assumptions listeners normally make about the way speakers will talk, rather than prescriptions for how one ought to talk. Philosopher Kent Bach writes: '...We need first to get clear on the character of Grice's maxims. They are not sociological generalizations about speech, nor they are moral prescriptions or proscriptions on what to say or communicate. Although Grice presented them in the form of guidelines for how to communicate successfully, I think they are better construed as presumptions about utterances, presumptions that we as listeners rely on and as speaker's exploit.[10]

Grice did not, however, assume that all people should constantly follow these maxims. Instead, he found it interesting when these were not respected, namely either "flouted" (with the listener being expected to be able to understand the message) or "violated" (with the listener being expected to not note this). Flouting would imply some other, hidden meaning. The importance was in what was not said. For example: Answering It's raining to someone who has suggested a game of tennis only disrespects the maxim

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[9] Kempson, Ruth M. "Grammar and Conversational Principles." In F. Newmeyer (ed.) Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press – 1988 - pp. 139-163.

[10] Bach, Kent, "Conversational Implicature." - Mind and Language -1994 - pp.124-162.

of relation on the surface, the reasoning behind this 'fragment' sentence is normally clear to the interlocutor (the maxim is just "flouted").[11]

Grice's Maxims have been criticized for not considering cultural differences and for being overly ambiguous. The Malagasy, for example, follow a completely opposite Cooperative Principle in order to achieve conversational cooperation. In their culture, speakers are reluctant to share information and flout the Maxim of Quantity by evading direct questions and replying on incomplete answers because of the risk of losing face by committing oneself to the truth of the information, as well as the fact that having information is a form of prestige.

Conclusion

It should be noted that the interest of scientists in the problems of the speech act continues to grow. A language does not stand still it develops primarily thanks to its speakers. The theory of speech acts has become quite widespread, including in applied areas of linguistics. This means that there are prerequisites for further development of the theory of speech acts. As well, it is defined that Cooperative principles is a set of maxims of conversation and usually people follow them in order to make the communication clear. However, it is possible to flout a maxim intentionally or unconsciously and thereby convey a different meaning than what is literally spoken. Therefore, cooperation is still taking place, but no longer on the literal level. Conversationalists can assume that when speakers intentionally flout a maxim, they still do so with the aim of expressing some thought. Thus, the Gricean Maxims serve a purpose both when they are followed and when they are flouted.

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[11] www.en./wiki/Cooperative_principle

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