

EVACUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION TO THE UZBEK SSR

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ABSTRACT:

This article highlights the regulations adopted during the Second World War to regulate evacuation processes. Based on the analysis of archival documents, scientific and fiction literature, as well as the memoirs of people who survived the evacuation, the geography of distribution and placement of the evacuated population in the Uzbek SSR is revealed.

Keywords: Evacuation, Evacuation Council, organized and unorganized evacuation, rail transport, evacuation points, evacuation departments, distribution, placement.

INTRODUCTION

In the history of the Uzbek SSR during the Second World War, a special place is occupied by the issue of the evacuation of the population from the front-line territories of the USSR to the rear regions. During the years of the severe war, the Uzbek SSR became a reliable and strong rear, saving more than 1.5 million people who suffered from the war, in particular women and children. According to official statistics, out of the total evacuated population, about 200,000 were children [1].

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the process of researching the topic, the regulatory documents adopted by the Soviet government during the Second World War were studied. In particular, archival sources were analyzed, which formed the basis of the study of the topic. In the process of preparing this topic, historical, comparative and sociological methods were used.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

At the beginning of June 1941 in Moscow, headed by the chairman of the Moscow Council V.P. Pronin created a special Commission for the evacuation of the population from Moscow in wartime, which on June 3, 1941 was presented by I.V. Stalin his plan and the draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the partial evacuation of the population from Moscow in wartime" [2]. The approval of the plan for that period meant that the leadership of the Soviet state foresaw and recognized in advance its impending defeat. And also, since any mobilization activities under international law were regarded as the beginning of a war, it was critically important for the Soviet Union to maintain the secrecy of this work. On June 5, on a memorandum on the evacuation of the population from Moscow in the event of a war, I.V. Stalin imposed the following resolution: "T-schu Pronin. I consider your proposal for a "partial" evacuation of the population of Moscow in "wartime"

to be untimely. I ask you to liquidate the evacuation commission, and stop talking about evacuation. Who will need and if it will be necessary to prepare an evacuation - the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars will notify you "[3].

As the process of operational organization of the evacuation shows, despite the official denial of the fact of preparations for the movement of people and material resources, a plan was developed.

In particular, on June 24, 1941, a resolution was issued by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the creation of an Evacuation Council [4].

Three days later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a resolution "On the procedure for the export and placement of human contingents and valuable property." The document clearly regulated the social status of persons subject to primary evacuation. First of all, skilled workers, engineers and employees of the evacuated enterprises were subject to relocation. The next order was physically healthy youth of military age, families of commanders of the Red Army and state security, employees of the administrative apparatus and the party [5].

On the basis of the above criteria for the selection of evacuees, on July 5, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a special procedure, which determined the route for distributing people to different regions.

The chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the republics and regional (territory) executive committees were instructed to ensure the preparation of housing for the evacuated population, to unload railway transport in a timely manner, to place the evacuees on the spot, to employ the rural population in collective farms and state farms and the working population at enterprises, as well as to provide medical assistance, provide clothes, shoes and food for the first time [6].

The evacuation, intended to save the life of the population, was also aimed at supporting industrial production and replenishing the rural labor force, depleted by conscription. The Evacuation Board sought to use evacuation to address labor shortages in both urban and rural areas. Specialized workers were sent to the cities where their skills were in demand, and the bulk of the evacuees were sent to the countryside, where the shortage of labor was more acute than in the cities.

The geography of the evacuation covered the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Moldavian SSR, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moscow and Leningrad. They were supposed to be placed in the Urals, in Western Siberia and the republics of Central Asia.

The following route was approved for the movement of evacuees to the Uzbek SSR in 1941-1942:

1. Kyiv - Kharkov - Rostov - Makhachkala - Krasnovodsk - Samarkand - Tashkent;
2. Odessa - Rostov - Krasnodar - Makhachkala - Krasnovodsk - Samarkand - Tashkent;
3. Moscow - Ryazan - Penza - Kuibyshev - Chkalov - Tashkent;
4. Moscow - Kazan - Sverdlovsk - Omsk - Novosibirsk - Alma-Ata - Frunze - Tashkent;

5. Leningrad - Sverdlovsk - Omsk - Novosibirsk - Alma-Ata - Frunze - Tashkent;

At the initial stage of the evacuation, the largest number of evacuees moved along the first two lines (from Kyiv and Odessa).

The division of the evacuated population into various categories related to its social status was reflected in the means of transportation, accommodation conditions, housing and food, and medical care. In general, depending on the category, the population was taken out in an organized and unorganized way.

Managers and qualified specialists of industrial enterprises and members of their families, families of Red Army commanders, as well as employees of central institutions, research institutes, universities, and creative unions were evacuated in an organized way, who were taken to the rear in a less disturbing situation.

The unorganized flow included women, children, the elderly and the disabled, a significant part of whom survived double or even triple evacuation. In addition, there were also refugees in this group who independently escaped from the areas of hostilities. For organized movement, special directives were adopted, which indicated the exact data on the means of transportation, time and destination. In relation to the civilian population, these data were often missing: the decisions did not indicate the mode of transport, did not mention the allocation of wagons or trucks, and did not designate the place of evacuation. In cases where this data was provided in part.

The difficulties encountered during the evacuation can be cited as an example of the Zmiev auxiliary boarding school for mentally retarded children, located in the Kharkov region of the Ukrainian SSR. On July 31, 1941, the premises of the boarding school were given over to a military hospital, and the school itself was transferred to the village of Vodyanoye, Zmievsky district (25 km from Kharkov). On October 4, by the decision of the Zmiev District Executive Committee, the school was transferred to the city of Zmiev, and on October 6, the military department and with its assistance was evacuated from the city of Zmiev.

Initially, the evacuation department of the Kharkov Regional Executive Committee gave direction to the city of Stalingrad, but at the time of the evacuation, the direction changed to the city of Engels, Saratov region. The city administration in Engels refused to accept the school. Then the evacuation department of the Saratov region assigned a school to the town of Iletskaya Zashchita, Chkalovsky region. There the school was redirected to Chkalov.

After the sanitization of children and disinfection of things, the evacuation department of the Chkalovsky region gave a direction to the city of Tashkent. During the evacuation, the school traveled in Pullman cars to the following stations - Debaltsevo, Kupyansk, Liski, Rtishchevo, Atkarsk, Saratov, Engels, Iletsk, Orenburg, Uralsk, Turkestan, Arys. The school with its management and pupils arrived at the Tashkent station on January 8 and was in the carriage until November 14. The reason for the delay at the railway station was due to the fact that the People's Commissariat of Education of the UzSSR learned about the arrival of the train a few hours in advance [7]. It took time to coordinate the issue with the Center and the leadership of the republic, as well as to find suitable housing and further accommodation for the evacuated children.

On November 14, the school was temporarily located at the Republican School for the Deaf and Dumb in the village of Lunacharsky in 4 small rooms, where it stayed until December 8. By order of December 5, 1941, the school was provided with premises on Kirgizskaya street No. The children are physically weak. If we take into account that they are mentally retarded with a physically reduced tone, then all this led to various diseases not only for children but also for educators [8].

The evacuation population arrived in Uzbekistan mainly by rail transport, water transport was partially involved, evacuation was also carried out by road, but many people traveled on foot. As an exception, it is possible to single out the evacuation of certain persons by aircraft. The social status of citizens determined the type and conditions of transport in which they were evacuated. The privileged position of party and state workers manifested itself in the conditions of the evacuation in the following way: during the evacuation, they were provided with first-class carriages equipped with restaurants and sleeping places. They were limited to 150 kilograms per worker and an additional 50 kilograms for each family member who accompanied the evacuation. Items allowed included clothing, linen, shoes, bedding, dinner plates, tea sets, teapots, and other household items other than furniture [9].

For example, on the first day of the war in the city of Vilna, Lithuanian SSR, at the railway station on the fifth line there was a train consisting of more than 50 wagons without a steam locomotive, and on the first line there was another, small train consisting of only six passenger cars, one freight car and a steam locomotive under steam. Everyone who wanted to leave was allowed into the big train, and it was packed to capacity, while only commanding officials could get into the small train and they were let in with special passes [10].

Famous writers, scientists and cultural figures were accommodated in somewhat more modest carriage compartments: Korney Chukovsky characterized his train as “an international carriage with separate compartments”, Lidia Chukovskaya, comparing international and ordinary carriages, described the former as warmer, softer and more spacious.

The well-known art critic and writer Mikhail German recalled his childhood journey to the evacuation with the following words: “Adults, not from officials, just rode in platform cars. And people “with position” traveled spaciouly, with whole families, with housekeepers and a huge amount of goods” [11].

Trains for the evacuation of industrial workers consisted of electric cars designed for suburban travel. Skilled workers were allowed to carry 100 kg of luggage free of charge per family head and up to 40 kg per family member.

In the worst condition were the conditions in the trains allocated for the evacuation of the general population. Their transportation was carried out in passenger (Pullman) cars, in freight cars (cars), and sometimes even on platforms. There were cases when people rode in open gondola cars or on platforms. Machine tools and materials were also located here. Under more favorable conditions, 2-3 covered wagons were allocated for women with children. Instead of the established norm of 36 people, 80-100 people were stuffed into them [12].

Zinaida Stepanishcheva, who was evacuated from Moscow in an unorganized manner, recalled that the train on which they were traveling was used in peacetime to transport livestock and goods [13].

If we talk about the evacuation of people by water transport, then it went mainly from territories with which land communication was blocked by German troops.

Most of those evacuated to the Caucasus (from the Crimea and Odessa) were sent by rail to the shores of the Caspian Sea. From there, from the ports of Makhachkala, Derbent and Baku, people went through the Krasnovodsk port to Central Asia and Western Siberia, and through the Guryev port to the South Urals and Kazakhstan. In addition, Astrakhan was an important transit point for evacuation transportation - people who arrived here along the Volga were also sent to Central Asia through the port of Krasnovodsk.

In her memoirs, Fira Grinberg says: "In the autumn of 1941, the boarding school was evacuated from the Moscow region. All trains with manpower and equipment went to the front. It was decided to evacuate the children along the Volga. We, 800 children, were put on a small steamer "Lermontov", with a capacity of 400 people. From the Volga we sailed along the Kama, from there to the Urals. Then we went to the Solikamsk district [14] in the vans for 8 days. Our entire kindergarten of 120 children was in one car. The cars were not heated, and it was 40 degrees below zero outside. In the middle of the car stood a potbelly stove - a small stove. We ate somewhere at the stations, they brought us cookies, bread and butter, there was no hot food" [15].

Thus, the evacuation of the population by water transport often had a combined character. The movement of people by water transport was only one of the links in the logistics chain. The large volume of evacuation traffic created significant difficulties - the transport infrastructure was not ready for such a sharp increase in passenger traffic. Already in August 1941, more than 20 thousand people accumulated in the port of Baku, in Makhachkala in October and November the number of undelivered passengers every day fluctuated within 40 thousand people[16].

So, in a memorandum addressed to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR Rodichev, it was noted that on November 3-4, 1941, about 30 thousand evacuated people were waiting in Krasnovodsk to be sent to a further destination. These were mainly those who passed through Makhachkala, where at that time there was still a lot of people who had not been transported to Krasnovodsk. In Krasnovodsk, the evacuated population was not subjected to organized accommodation, as a result of which there were facts of arbitrary arrival of echelons with evacuees to Uzbekistan [17].

In other cases, people were evacuated in cars or trucks. In this regard, the military, managerial and political elites were especially well endowed. Despite the ban on the use of government vehicles for this purpose, the practice was widespread, especially among officers who regularly used vehicles to evacuate their families. The command given to the troops of the Western Front in early July noted that while the active units at the front were in dire need of road transport, a significant number of cars settled in the rear and were used indiscriminately [18].

The evacuation of the population to the Uzbek SSR was carried out in two stages. At the first, it was the most massive and went from the summer of 1941 to the spring of 1942. At the second, it was carried out on a smaller scale, from a more limited area from the summer of 1942 to the autumn of 1943.

So, in the first months of the war, the evacuation of the population was carried out by the Main Resettlement Administration under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. By decision of the State Defense Committee of September 26, 1941, it was reorganized into the Office of the Commissioner for the Evacuation of the Population [19].

The Department for the Evacuation of the Population was entrusted with the following functions:

- a) organizing the reception and resettlement of evacuees, both in a planned and unorganized manner;
- b) distribution on the territory of the Uzbek SSR of the population who arrived in a planned manner according to special government decrees. For example, according to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR of November 17, 1941, 96 families of senior workers of the Rostov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Regional Executive Committee were provided with housing, registration and employment in Tashkent and Samarkand [20].
- c) servicing the evacuated population along the way;
- d) the economic structure of the evacuated population in places of resettlement [21].

At the same time, it was necessary to conduct a correct and timely accounting of the evacuated population. For this purpose, on July 8, 1941, the Resettlement Department under the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR issued an instruction on accounting for the arriving evacuated population, according to which the registration was carried out according to the following forms: a list sent in an echelon; a list of families and persons who arrived in the district, city (village); personal card for children evacuated without parents.

Each region had its own plan for the reception and distribution of evacuees. The total number of the arrived population, subject to accounting, did not include families of military personnel, families of employees and troops of the NKVD, as well as employees of enterprises and institutions.

As of December 15, 1941, it was planned to place 525,000 people in the regions of the Uzbek SSR, but in fact 665,419 people arrived. These included 5,000 people evacuated to state farms and 80,000 workers and employees who were not included in the registration books of evacuation centers [22].

In addition to officially registered persons, several thousand spontaneous refugees and migrants also settled on the territory of the republic at railway stations, marinas, bazaars, cities and other places and lived at different times from several hundred to several thousand neglected children and adolescents [23].

The highest peak of the influx of the evacuated population occurred in the second half of 1941 and the beginning of 1942.

The number of evacuees in the UzSSR on February 1, 1942 [24].

| Region name | Number of evacuees |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| Tashkent city | 45 167 |
| Tashkent region | 79 960 |
| Ferghana region | 92 415 |
| Andizhan region | 102 226 |
| Namangan region | 80 770 |
| Samarkand region | 135 000 |
| Bukhara region | 160 000 |
| Surkhandarya region | 12 569 |
| Khorezm region | 15 462 |
| Karakalpak ASSR | 51 662 |
| Total | 775 231 |

CONCLUSION

The evacuation of the population during the Second World War, it can be stated that this process once again confirms that the USSR was not ready for a military clash with Nazi Germany. That is why, even before the war, Stalin's entourage began preparing regulations for the systematic evacuation of the population from the front line. At the same time, taking into account the historical experience of evacuating the population during the years of famine (1920-1922), a large contingent of the population, along with production facilities, scientific, educational and cultural institutions, was planned to be moved to the Uzbek SSR. Along with this, a large flow of unorganized evacuation of the civilian population was also transferred to the republic.

The study of the peculiarities of the organization of evacuation reveals the social stratification of people into "important", "less important" and "necessary". For the first two groups, an exact plan for comfortable transportation, the exact point of residence, housing, food and employment was developed and approved.

A significant number of women, children, the elderly and the disabled, who "needed" to be preserved for the sake of humanity, were abandoned to the will of fate. Many of them did not know where they were going, wandered from station to station, were not provided with food. The poor organization of the evacuation of the population, the lack of control over its correct movement, led to the fact that people began to arrive in the Uzbek SSR who were not on the official lists of evacuees. This created a great burden on local authorities involved in the reception and accommodation of evacuees and put a great responsibility on the republic, first of all, for saving people's lives, providing them with housing, food, clothing, and employment.

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